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Introduction: Developing World Cup host cities 
One year before the 2018 FIFA Men’s World Cup in Russia, Volgograd regional governor Andrey Bocharov gave an interview in front of the new stadium under construction. Standing next to deputy prime minister Vitaly Mutko, who had flown in from Moscow for an inspection, gover-
nor Bocharov explained the value of preparing the city for the World Cup: 
The World Cup will bring a lot. There are many works that will remain as a legacy for the Volgo-
grad Region, for the hero city Volgograd, for residents, and for visitors. We are absolutely confi-
dent that the World Cup will give extra opportunities for development […]. Volgograd residents 
know that large-scale work is occurring on public utilities. […] These are facilities that are not 
immediately visible, but they will give an entirely different quality of life. And the most impor-
tant thing is that all this will become a foundation for our development […]. And everything will 
serve the people [Volgograd24, 2017].
In this statement, governor Bocharov gave voice to one of the dominant rationales behind hosting the 
World Cup, linking the football tournament to a wide-ranging plan for urban and regional development. 
Primarily targeted at improving the material conditions and socio-economic profiles of Russia’s periph-
eral cities, the planners of Russia 2018 continued the global trend of using mega-events for reasons other 
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Planners, politicians, boosters and other elites often use mega-events like the 2018 FIFA Men’s World Cup as a strategy for 
urban development. This was also the case with the World Cup, hosted in eleven Russian cities and designed to modernize 
Russia’s peripheral host cities. While the idea of developing cities through mega-events is common, the Russian experience 
displays much that is new. 
This paper examines urban development in the World Cup as an example of mobile policy, exploring how this mega-event 
was imported from abroad and how this policy mutated as it was implemented on the ground in Russia. The specificities of 
the Russian experience were due in large part to the ways in which the World Cup organizing committee was created and 
operated as an extension of the central government in Moscow. What appeared at first to be a way for Russian peripheral 
host cities to differentiate themselves through urban development in a form of inter-urban competition, turned out to be a 
reestablishment of the central state in regional spatial planning. In this way, even as certain material conditions in the host 
cities were improved, the World Cup represented not an expression of regional democracy, nor even a strategy for inter-urban 
differentiation, but rather one more instance of development dictated from the center and from afar.
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than sport [Horne, 2017], particularly in terms of urban development [Smith, 2012]. Seen from this per-
spective, the Russian World Cup was the latest expression of a mobile policy that has travelled the globe, 
touching down and transforming urban planning strategies in host cities worldwide [Lauermann, 2014].
One of the problems with these development strategies, however, is that mobile “off-the-shelf” 
policies seldom work as advertised when they are implemented in new contexts. In other words, as 
effects on the ground often diverge from what planners imagined, mobile policies are understood to 
be prone to mutation [Temenos, McCann, 2013]. This has led to a growing body of literature where 
scholars worldwide have attempted to trace not just the paths of mobile policies, but also the ways in 
which they mutate in different contexts [McCann, 2011; Peck, Theodore, 2015; Ward, 2011]. Following 
this, the World Cup can be explored along two dimensions: first as a form of mobile urbanism tied 
particularly to mega-events, and second in terms of the mutations that occurred between planners’ 
stated intentions and actual results on the ground in the host cities.
At first, the rationales expressed by World Cup planners seemed to fit both the remit of me-
ga-event-driven urban development mobile policy and the infrastructural needs of the peripheral 
host cities. Unlike Moscow and St. Petersburg (and to a lesser degree Sochi and Kazan, both of which 
had previously hosted mega-events), the majority of the host cities for the World Cup required sub-
stantial infrastructural investment not only to meet requirements established by FIFA (the owners 
of the World Cup) but also, and more importantly, to provide adequate quality of life for residents. 
Before being selected as hosts, these cities suffered from poor and insufficient municipal services, 
such as inadequate water and power, and unacceptable transit infrastructure such as broken roads 
and aging, under-capacity airports and train stations. From this perspective, hosting was intended 
to improve material conditions in the host cities over the long term through the mechanisms of 
satisfying FIFA requirements for the World Cup. This is what governor Bocharov was referring to, 
above, when he spoke of the value of hosting. He explained Volgograd’s preparations not in terms of 
a football tournament but rather as a project to develop municipal infrastructure in order to improve 
the quality of life for residents over the long term. To be sure, nearly 8 million visitors during the 
World Cup arrived in the host cities in newly constructed or renovated airports and train stations and 
traveled to the games on freshly expanded and repaved roads. 
More broadly, these infrastructural improvements were tied to the idea of increasing each city-re-
gion’s investment potential, as noted by President Vladimir Putin in a meeting of the 2018 World Cup 
organizing committee: 
We are talking not only about stadiums, but about creating modern infrastructure that will, for 
many coming years, work to improve the socioeconomic development of the territories. This will 
in large part determine the attractiveness for investment, and simply improve the lives of the 
people [Sverdlovsk Gubernatorial website, 2015].
In the context of the World Cup as an urban development program, organizers intended these 
infrastructure improvements to increase investment in the host cities and their regions. In this way, 
hosting the mega-event was a strategy for differentiation within a framework of urban entrepreneur-
ialism and inter-urban competition [Hall, 2006; Lauermann, Davidson, 2013]. As I argue in this paper, 
policy mutations occurred during the importation and implementation of these plans, which led to 
outcomes that diverged from what was promised. I demonstrate that these mutations occurred not 
only due to the nature of mobile policy, but also because of the specificities of how the Russian World 
Cup was organized and deployed. Despite much of the rhetoric from organizers, the 2018 World Cup 
was less a bottom-up strategy for inter-urban differentiation — as could be expected from listening to 
the rhetoric from organizers — than it was a reentry of the central state into Russian spatial planning 
[Golubchikov, 2017]. This represented a form of paternalistic extraverted urbanism [Hall, Hubbard, 
1998; Lauermann, 2018] crafted and managed at the federal level and distributed to the peripheries, 
and accompanied by the mutations that typically occur with mobilized policy. 
The material presented here comes from a multi-year, multi-site research project on the 2018 World 
Cup, centered primarily on the host cities of Ekaterinburg and Volgograd but also including work 
in other host cities as well. It is based on expert interviews and conversations with 2018 World Cup 
organizing committee members, FIFA employees, sports business executives, municipal authorities, 
and urban experts, as well as a study of planning documents, event contracts, government decrees, 
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and media reports. To take stock of the ways in which policy was implemented on the ground, I con-
ducted extensive site visits and informal interviews with residents in a number of host cities and 
from a variety of different backgrounds, including urban activists, academics, small business owners, 
journalists, students, and market sellers. 
Policy mobilities and mega-event urban development
There are a variety of reasons why nations aspire to host mega-events — defined here as “ambulatory 
occasions of a fixed duration that (a) attract a large number of visitors, (b) have large mediated reach, 
(c) come with large costs, and (d) have large impacts on the built environment and the population” 
[Müller, 2015a, p. 3]. Commonly these rationales include an economic argument, as mega-events are 
said to bring significant financial benefits [Malfas, Theodoraki, Houlihan, 2004; Preuss, 2004]. Me-
ga-events are also said to increase employment and tourism and serve as a means for hosts to broad-
cast or reframe particular conceptions of the nation to a global audience — an especially alluring 
proposition for emerging economies outside of the Global North [Black, Westhuizen, 2004; Cornelis-
sen, 2010; Grix, 2014; Hiller, 2000]. Underlying all this is a conception of hosting mega-events as a 
strategy for urban development [Chalkley, Essex, 1999; Coaffee, 2010]. 
The paradigm of this strategy originated during the Barcelona 1992 Summer Olympics and has since 
spread around the globe as the so-called “Barcelona Model” of mega-event-driven urban development 
and renewal [Degen, García, 2012; Essex, Chalkley, 1998; Marshall, 2000; Qu, Spaans, 2009; Zimbalist, 
2016]. Within the context of the 1992 Summer Olympics, and inspired by the requirements of the me-
ga-event, host city authorities enacted the Barcelona Urban Renewal Plan. This initiative successfully 
refashioned the city’s semi-derelict industrial waterfront into miles of world-class beaches, shops, bars, 
and restaurants, and demonstrated to a worldwide audience of policymakers that mega-event hosting 
could be leveraged to accomplish ambitious urban transformation projects [González, 2011]. 
As it became mobilized into globally-applicable policy, this model spread beyond the confines of 
the Summer Olympics to attract host cities for other mega-events, including the Winter Olympics, 
the FIFA Men’s Football World Cup, and a variety of other less prestigious but nevertheless signif-
icant mega-events all around the world [Black, 2008; 2014; Koch, Valiyev, 2015]. It should be noted, 
however, that in the intervening years, the Barcelona Model has become hyperbole, commonly pre-
sented as a miracle cure for a city’s development ills. The boosters of this mobile policy commonly 
neglect to communicate that because of the ambitious urban development plan, the Barcelona Olym-
pics cost between 200% and 400% more than originally promised [Brunet, 1995; Flyvbjerg, Stewart, 
Budzier, 2016], to say nothing of the fact that not every potential host city has the latent capacity 
to draw tourists like the famous Catalonian capital. In this light, the current study should be un-
derstood not as a comparison with Barcelona itself, but rather as an example of how the model of 
mega-event-driven urban development, originating in Barcelona, has been mobilized to Russia and 
articulated on the ground in Russian host cities. 
Still, despite its drawbacks and the often-exaggerated presentation, the fact remains that the Bar-
celona Model has come to serve as one of the most recognizable legitimation strategies for investing 
in hosting mega-events. Decades after its origin, the continued propagation of the Barcelona Model 
across the globe, and into a variety of different national contexts, lends itself to analysis through 
the policy mobilities literature. This body of scholarship endeavors to map the geographies of fast, 
travelling policy as it is imported from elsewhere and applied, often experimentally, in new contexts 
around the globe. Scholars have explored the transformations engendered by diverse neoliberalisms 
[Peck, Theodore, 2015], investigated the ways in which mobile policies constitute the urban [McCann, 
Ward, 2011], and — most importantly for this study — traced the paths of mega-events as they re-
shape the socio-material fabric of host cities across the globe [Cook, Ward, 2011; Lauermann, 2014; 
Oliver, Lauermann, 2017; Salazar et al., 2017; Temenos, McCann, 2013]. Crucially, these scholars high-
light the mutable nature of mobile policy, emphasizing how the relational and heterogenous spaces 
of policy invention, circulation, translation, and implementation inevitably affect the policy itself as 
well as its outcomes. This is key for understanding how a Barcelona-style mega-event-driven urban 
development plan might produce outcomes that diverge from what planners promised or expected. 
In other words, it is not enough to note that the Barcelona Model has been mobilized into diverse 
environments across the globe, but also to note how that implementation has mutated from the ex-
pected or promised results when articulated in a specific locale. 
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Even aside from the Barcelona Model, there has been a tendency among planners, politicians, and 
other mega-event boosters to overstate the benefits of hosting mega-events, as promises of an eco-
nomic bonanza often are exaggerated or distributed only to a narrow segment of the population [Abel-
son, 2011; Matheson, Baade, 2004], while employment opportunities commonly turn out to be short 
term and low pay [Horne, Manzenreiter, 2006; Malfas, Theodoraki, Houlihan, 2004]. Generally, the liter-
ature shows that mega-event-related urban development plans are rife with deleterious consequenc-
es, including uneven development, gentrification, and litanies of unfulfilled promises [Andranovich, 
Burbank, Heying, 2001; Gaffney, 2010; Pillay, Bass, 2008; Watt, 2013]. It is here, at these moments of 
adverse or unanticipated outcomes, that a focus on policy mobilities and mutations comes into play. 
The mutational perspective through a policy mobilities lens allows for a more nuanced reading of me-
ga-event-led development and a richer analysis of how various policy promises go awry. 
In certain cases, it is possible to home in on the reasons why mutations might occur. In terms of 
mega-event policy, one of the fundamental challenges with hosting relates to the ways in which the 
needs of the mega-event may conflict with the needs of the city. Often, under the pressure of inflexible 
event-related deadlines, mega-event priorities outweigh other concerns and, in processes of infrastruc-
tural, financial, and legal seizure [Müller, 2017], the mega-event plan becomes the city’s plan. Among 
other effects, this can result in social exclusion and other marginalizations, various forms of gentrifica-
tion, seizures, or evictions, uneven development, and costly, unnecessary, and overcapacity infrastruc-
tures — a far cry from the supposed tourist paradise suggested by the dreams of the Barcelona Model. 
Within these studies, there is a notable trend to focus on cases within the Global North, or if they 
stray outside of this territory, then the tendency is to remain limited within a North-South dialectic. In 
contrast, this paper contributes to a strand in the Anglo-American academy that endeavors to theorize 
the urban from the Global East [Edensor, Jayne, 2012; Müller, 2018]. This lack of research in, of, and from 
the Easts is found in the literature on both mobilities and mega-events, though with the spread of me-
ga-event hosts beyond traditional territories, scholarship has begun to appear in this gap, however par-
tially. For instance, Salazar et al. [2017] edited a volume situated at the intersection of mega-events and 
mobilities, within which Girginov [2017] examines mega-event transformations and mobilizations in a 
comparison of the 2012 Olympics in London and the 2014 Olympics in Sochi. This study valorizes the East 
and places it in broader conversation with the world, but does not address policy mobilities specifically, 
instead employing a broader conceptualization of mobilities framed within an exploration of how hosts 
attempt to leverage mega-events to accomplish political or economic goals. Similarly, Lauermann [2017] 
provides a critical and much-needed analysis of the mechanisms and economic geographies of policy 
transfer as materialized in mega-event preparations, but he does not discuss the Easts. Müller [2015b] 
focuses on mega-events and policy mobilities in regard to the failures of the sustainability agenda in the 
2014 Sochi Olympics but does not highlight the urban. Finally, Oancă [2015] works at the intersection of 
mega-events, mobile policies, and the urban, in her analysis of the attempts to lobby for the European 
Capital of Culture in Perm, Russia, though she highlights policy actors more than urban materiality. 
The present study is situated among these works and aspires to complement them, offering an anal-
ysis of the articulation of the 2018 Men’s Football World Cup in Russia, from the perspective of policy 
mobilities, and grounded in the urban. It begins from an understanding of the World Cup as an urban 
and regional development plan for Russia’s periphery that was inspired by the Barcelona Model and 
enacted primarily by Moscow authorities, intended as a means for spatial modernization and differen-
tiation within the context of inter-urban competition, despite its reliance on centralized authorities. 
Finally, the paper unpacks some moments of mutation within the articulation of this particular World 
Cup, contingent on local, regional, and national factors, while identifying infrastructural outcomes that 
diverged from what was promised or intended, and exploring some reasons underlying those mutations. 
Why host the 2018 World Cup? 
The rationales for hosting a mega-event can be discerned through a combined examination of the 
bid books that were used to win hosting rights, the discourses produced by organizers, and the plans 
actually enacted by authorities. This triangulation provides a foundation of (mostly) public informa-
tion that can shed light on the goals underlying the mega-event. This perspective emphasizes the 
stated goals of hosting, rather than providing an investigation of underlying political or business 
motivations. This is not intended to steer discussion away from investigations of other, less public 
motivations, nor to diminish the importance of protest and civic action against the corruption and 
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inequalities that almost always accompany mega-events (see for instance [Dart, Wagg, 2016; Lenskyj, 
2012; 2016; Transparency International, 2016]). Rather, in this paper, I work with the official ration-
ales for hosting — as stated by organizers and decisionmakers — because I am concerned here with 
the overlaps between mega-events and urban development strategies. I do not intend with this per-
spective to suggest that other hosting rationales did not exist; instead, I employ this perspective with 
the understanding that the official rationales exist among many potential others. 
The Russia 2018 World Cup bid book, submitted to FIFA in 2010, is a logical place to begin searching 
for the explanatory rationales that launched Russia’s aspirations to host the World Cup. The bid book 
was exhaustive: split into three volumes and totaling over a thousand pages, it covered everything from 
Russia’s history and political makeup, long-term development plans for each host city, detailed layouts 
for each stadium, and more. Within this wealth of material, organizers also explained why they wanted 
to host. Focusing only on domestic aspects, the key idea was to use “football as a mechanism for soci-
etal, cultural and economic development” [Russia 2018 World Cup Bid Committee, 2010, vol. 2, p. 108], a 
clear reference to the idea of leveraging the mega-event to accomplish goals not necessarily associated 
only with sport [Girginov, 2017]. This was later broken into three goals: to boost the quality of national 
football, to impart new skills to Russian citizens, and to modernize, expand, and improve the quality of 
urban infrastructure. This final goal was targeted specifically at peripheral host cities and was intended 
to make good on FIFA’s stated goal of using football for development. 
Russian political-economic developments have long been analyzed through the lens of the core-pe-
riphery model (among many others, see [Chase-Dunn, Hall, 2019; Helf, 1996; Nefedova, 2008]). This 
analysis has functioned at multiple scales, viewing the nation itself as peripheral or semi-peripheral 
within a broader world system [Wallerstein, 1979; 1984], as well as internally within Russia, at regional 
levels [Honneland, Blakkisrud, 2018; Liven, 2008]. Political-economic power is commonly understood 
to reside primarily within Moscow, as a function of the hierarchical command structure suffused with 
informal relationships that is sometimes known as the power vertical or sistema [Ledyaev, 2008; Lede-
neva, 2013]. This view elides the economic power generated by Russian regional cities, the nuanced 
political games played by actors at various levels, and the hegemonic role that regional capitals them-
selves play within their regions. A city like Volgograd can be seen as central when viewed in relation 
to the context of the Volgogradskaya region, but also peripheral when in relation with Moscow, to say 
nothing of foreign cities. These multiple perspectives on core-peripheral relations have implications 
on the way that the World Cup was planned and articulated throughout Russia. 
Overall, the World Cup was legitimized by organizers with the rhetoric of making Russian cities and cit-
izens more competitive on global scales. Put another way, one of the aims of the World Cup was to take pe-
ripheral host cities like Volgograd or Ekaterinburg, and place them in conversation with global cities, min-
imizing their relative peripherality by positioning them as host cities of a globally prestigious mega-event. 
Further, this positioning was assumed to bring socioeconomic benefits and result in an improved quality 
of life. I do not intend to analyze the value proposition of these plans, nor to criticize the trickle-down ide-
ologies invoked by organizers. Rather, I am interested in how organizers linked hosting to socioeconomic 
benefits through the improvement of material infrastructures, under the assumption that these improved 
infrastructures would lead to increased investment, expanded tourism, and reduced peripherality. In other 
words, I am curious to examine how neoliberal state rescaling was articulated through the idea of leverag-
ing the mega-event to promote host cities above the national state. And finally, in line with a policy mobil-
ities approach, I am curious to explore how these plans were (or were not) actually enacted on the ground. 
The narratives of neoliberal rescaling and implicit trickle-down benefits to the population are stand-
ard fare for mega-event organizers around the globe; the enduring popularity of the Barcelona Model is 
testament to the potency of mega-event hosting as a strategy in inter-urban competition. What was note-
worthy in Russia 2018 was neither the infrastructure plans nor the rhetoric — both of which are routine 
worldwide — but rather the ways in which this mega-event was conceived and managed from the cen-
tral government and dispensed to the regions. What makes this unique is that this centralized policy was 
wrapped in the familiar discourses of urban rescaling, as though the city were following the traditional ne-
oliberal mega-event playbook, except that in actuality central authorities in Moscow were firmly in control. 
Some government involvement is common in the organization of most mega-events — these are 
projects of national importance, after all — but Russia 2018 stands out for the degree to which this 
mega-event was controlled from the highest levels of the central state. By way of contrast: going back 
to the founding of the Barcelona Model, the Barcelona 1992 Olympic Organizing Committee (COOB 
’92) was composed of a consortium from the Barcelona City Council, the Spanish Olympic Committee, 
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the Catalonian Generalitat, and the Spanish government, among others. Figures from the municipality 
and the national Olympic Committee dominated at all levels of the COOB, with the mayor of Barcelona 
serving as president of every board, and the Olympic Committee president serving as vice-president 
[Barcelona 1992 Olympic Organizing Committee, 1993, p. 19, Vol. 2]. Only thereafter did figures from the 
Catalonian and Spanish governments make appearances. Even in the COOB General Assembly — the 
supreme decision-making organ of the Games — members of the municipality and the Olympic Com-
mittee outnumbered Catalonian and Spanish government figures two to one. This structure shaped 
how Barcelona 1992 played out, as the various assemblies and boards voted to determine how develop-
ments should take place. Since municipal figures held comfortable — but not overwhelming — majori-
ties, local interests were less at risk of losing out to regional or national plans. Though not without its 
problems or deleterious outcomes, managing Barcelona 1992 was an exercise in locally-grounded de-
cision-making and coalition building, involving members of government at all levels (though skewed 
in favor of the local instead of the regional or federal), as well as individuals from the private sector. 
Barcelona was far from unique in this composition: typically, organizing committees are composed of 
similar mixes of various levels of government alongside non-governmental figures, and certain me-
ga-events have taken place without much government participation at all. For instance, the organizing 
committee for the 2006 FIFA Men’s Football World Cup in Germany was mostly composed of former 
football players, sports officials, and businessmen, with only a handful of political figures involved in 
any capacity [Frankfurter Allgemeine, 2015; RP Online, 2005]. This emphasis on private actors has be-
come the norm in the articulation of neoliberal mega-events [Raco, 2013].
In contrast to these examples, Russia 2018 was a remarkably centralized affair, oriented around 
and managed from the federal capital. Despite the fact that the World Cup took place in eleven cities 
across European Russia (see Fig. 1), and as such could be expected to reflect a diversity of local and 
regional concerns, the planning and delivery of this mega-event displayed a high level of consistency 
across the host cities. This uniformity was visible in multiple domains, from the rhetoric repeated by 
authorities at all scales, to the language employed in regional planning decrees, to the sites of infra-
structural intervention, and the ways in which these projects were managed. This was a testament to 
the power of Moscow authorities in governing the World Cup, but it is also noteworthy because of the 
contradictions inherent in deploying a centralized event accompanied and legitimized by the rhetoric 
of bottom-up entrepreneurial urban governance. 
© Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 3.0
Fig. 1. Map showing all 11 host regions and cities for the 2018 FIFA Men’s Football World Cup in Russia. This study 
focused primarily on Volgograd and Ekaterinburg, but also conducted work in Sochi, Kazan, and St. Petersburg 
Source: original author Morwen, modified by author.
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Organizing the 2018 World Cup 
The involvement of the centralized state was a key factor of the Russian World Cup project from the 
start, even before hosting rights had been granted. Creating and managing the bid was an organiza-
tion known as the Russia 2018 World Cup bid committee, comprised of figures in the Russian federal 
state apparatus. At the center of bid committee were Chairman Vitaly Mutko and Chief Executive Of-
ficer Alexey Sorokin [Borbély, 2017]. Together, Mutko and Sorokin hatched the plan to host the World 
Cup in Russia and assembled the bid. Both men were in the top tiers, working at Russian Football 
Union (RFU), the governing body of Russian football and the Russian representative in FIFA. Mutko 
was president while Sorokin served as CEO and General Secretary. 
Both Mutko and Sorokin came from state structures. While RFU president, Mutko also served as St. 
Petersburg’s representative to the Federation Council, before being promoted to Sports Minister for the 
Russian Federation. He performed both roles until president Medvedev decreed that sports federations 
must be run by professionals instead of government officials [RIA Novosti, 2009a; 2009b]. Alexey Sorokin, 
meanwhile, had worked as a diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then served in the Moscow 
city government before joining Mutko at the RFU [Kominsky et al., 2018]. President Medvedev’s attempts 
to separate state and sport did not seem to apply to the World Cup bid, as Mutko leveraged his position 
in federal structures to garner official support from the highest levels of the government [Borbély, 2017].
In 2009, then-prime minister Vladimir Putin issued federal decree 1469, placing the full weight 
of the federal government behind the World Cup bid. He appointed First Deputy Prime Minister Igor 
Shuvalov to the bid committee, ensuring that all three top men in the bid committee hailed from 
the state apparatus [Gazeta.ru, 2009; Russian Federal Government, 2009]. Subsequently, the ability 
to marshal full support from the highest levels of government was a key selling point in the Russian 
bid book and went a long way toward convincing reluctant FIFA decisionmakers that a Russian World 
Cup would occur without incident and, crucially, be lucrative for all parties involved. 
As all World Cup bids, the Russian bid was a contract between the organizers and FIFA. This le-
gally binding document promised the full cooperation and collaboration of fifteen federal ministries 
and the unqualified support of every host city administration and municipal council. This degree of 
unanimous support speaks to the centralized power at the heart of this project. Nor did this degree 
of centralization disappear once the bid had been won, as the Russia 2018 World Cup bid committee 
dissolved and reformed into the Russia 2018 Local Organizing Committee (LOC). The key players 
from the bid committee remained in positions of authority, but the new LOC was expanded to in-
clude officials from all levels of government, including regional governors. Unlike most other me-
ga-events, however, the composition of the Russian LOC was overwhelmingly federal and centralized 
in its makeup, and Russia’s (semi)authoritarian governance structure [Gel’man, 2015; 2008] ensured 
that regional authorities took direction from their federal superiors in key decisions. In this light, the 
authorities in Russian host cities can be better understood as executors of a federal plan rather than 
as autonomous actors working in the interests of their localities. 
The Russian LOC was divided into four levels: the Supervisory Board (responsible for strategic 
development), the Managing Board (translating the decisions of the Supervisory Board into policy), 
the national level LOC (coordinating and communicating up and down the hierarchy), and the re-
gional LOCs (implementing developments in each of the host cities). At the top of this hierarchy, in 
charge of the Supervisory Board, sat President Putin. Under him, the rest of this board was staffed by 
representatives from numerous federal ministries, including the Minister for Justice, the Minister for 
Regional Development, the Minister for Transport, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the director 
of the Federal Security Service, any of whom should give the reader an appreciation of the federal 
importance placed on the World Cup project. Aside from these, the Supervisory Board also included 
select regional governors, members of the RFU, and some representatives from state-owned and non-
state-owned businesses. Continuing down the hierarchy, the other levels within the organizing com-
mittee were similarly staffed with men from federal ministries. It is telling that the FIFA-LOC board, 
created so that the World Cup owners could monitor developments, was inserted in the middle of the 
hierarchy, below the second level Managing Board, indicating that FIFA had little practical authority. 
Instead, the structure of the Russian LOC established the Russian president and the federal govern-
ment under him as the ultimate authority in all matters pertaining to the World Cup. 
In this light, it would be erroneous to see the Russian LOC as working with the Russian govern-
ment, as is typically the case in other mega-events. Rather, it would be more accurate to say that the 
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Russian LOC was itself a branch of the central government, though a temporary and project-based 
one. Subsequently, the 2018 World Cup can be seen as a state project, created at the federal level and 
dispersed down through various bureaucratic hierarchies through decree, covered in the trappings of 
a sports event but in actuality much broader than a mere tournament. This is the sense in which Rus-
sia’s recent mega-events can be understood as a strategic re-entry of the federal state into regional 
spatial planning [Golubchikov, 2017; Golubchikov, Badyina, 2016]. Again, what is remarkable about 
these processes in Russia is how they were legitimized with the neoliberal rhetoric of inter-urban 
competition framed in a city-centric focus, despite their centralized character. 
This hybridity rarely features in mega-events hosted in other countries, which suggests a varie-
gated interpretation of mega-events, contingent on the sociopolitical and economic specificities of 
a given host city or country. Thus, for example, the London Olympics were about rekindling national 
pride in a former imperial power, delivered through neoliberal public-private partnerships [Mackay, 
2012; Raco, 2014], while the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa was a hybrid of neocolonial and 
postcolonial discourses, intended to introduce the nation to global flows of capital but also enriching 
a coterie of well-connected private elites [Chari, 2014; Cottle, 2011; Cornelissen, 2004]. Conversely, 
the Chinese experience in Beijing was intended as a reframing of the nation on the global stage and a 
wide-ranging urban development scheme, though without the neoliberal discourses commonly seen 
in mega-events [Brownell, 2008; Cook, Miles, 2017; Zhang, Zhao, 2009]. The mega-events most similar 
to the Russian experience with the World Cup are, perhaps unsurprisingly, found in the so-called 
near abroad — Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, to name a few — all of which feature various 
flavors of the same neoliberal discourses that in reality represented a retrenchment of the central 
state [Gogishvili, 2018; Koch, Valiyev, 2015; Militz, 2016]. In this way, we could say that that these 
are all varieties of authoritarian mega-events. This interpretation dovetails with the notion that that 
neoliberal urbanism is related to political cultures, resulting in a multiplicity of variegated neoliber-
alisms across the globe [Brenner, Theodore, 2002; Lauermann, Davidson, 2013]. 
Development promises and outcomes in Ekaterinburg
Throughout the preparatory period, neoliberal rhetoric legitimizing the World Cup was repeated at all lev-
els of government, from the president down to municipal administrators. Nor was this rhetoric confined 
to one host city over another; rather, it was reproduced nationwide in a variety of contexts rather, it was 
reproduced nationwide in a variety of contexts. A typical example can be seen in the mega-event-driven 
urban development plan enacted in the host city of Ekaterinburg. During the early years of the prepara-
tions, Ekaterinburg was, after decades of waiting, promised an expansion of their metro system. 
Since opening in 1991, Ekaterinburg had only a single metro line, although every train optimis-
tically displayed a map with a three-line network, with the word “prospective” marked over the two 
non-existent lines — clearly displayed the city’s ambitions and hopes. The metro serviced almost 
10% of Ekaterinburg’s population daily [NSK Metro, 2015], and administrators regularly promised ex-
pansions of both stations and lines. Within the World Cup development program, organizers initially 
promised to open the long-awaited second line, with two stations near the football stadium. This was 
an attempt to marry the needs of the World Cup with the needs of the city [Moskvina, 2013].
 In this way, the metro project was linked explicitly to the World Cup, all of which fit into the 
broader national plans of Russia 2018 to improve and expand the country’s transport infrastructure, 
aiming simultaneously to fulfill the short-term requirements of moving football fans from all over 
the city into the stadium zone, while still satisfying the city’s long-term needs. This seemed a clear 
example of local authorities working with federal decisionmakers in the context of mega-event host-
ing in order to bring a stalled but municipally beneficial project to life. 
In the end, however, federal decisionmakers refused to fund the metro expansion, in favor of projects 
that were considered critical to the mega-event, like the stadium and the airport [E1.ru, 2013]. Due to 
this lack of crucial federal support, the new metro lines did not come to pass — despite the fact that they 
would have fulfilled the goals originally promised both to residents and in the World Cup bid. In terms of 
satisfying FIFA requirements for fan mobility, it was deemed more cost-efficient to add dedicated buses 
to the city’s transport system, though this was only a temporary measure aimed at the event and left 
no lasting benefits for residents. Without federal transfers to undertake metro work, the Ekaterinburg 
municipality shelved their expansion plans once more. The public has now endured multiple decades of 
failed promises to expand the metro system. Long used to disappointment, some residents used humor 
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as a tactic to explain this latest failure: “We used to have five-year plans, but now we have thirty-year 
plans. Tell me that’s not progress!” (March 2018, Ekaterinburg). Echoing the glowing reports from So-
viet centralized economic planning, this joke contextualized current developments within a broader 
framing of bureaucratic inefficiencies that reached back to the USSR. In so doing, this Ekaterinburg res-
ident placed the failure of the metro expansion in a long line of broken promises from the authorities. 
A public transport expert that worked with the Ekaterinburg municipality explained the problems 
inherent in tying urban development to mega-events: 
The bureaucrats have this idea that they can renovate and develop the city by holding these 
events […], the problem is that the promises sound good on paper, but they don’t come true. We 
have been waiting for the new metro line for over twenty years, but it is too expensive and, any-
way, the city prioritizes drivers (July 2016, Ekaterinburg).
This expert blamed the metro failure on the extreme expenses involved in underground construc-
tion — a restriction that exists in every country — and underscored the importance of federal support. 
Following this, it is logical to attach a costly municipal transport development to a federally support-
ed national project. Theoretically, having promised to host the World Cup, federal authorities would 
be forced to attend to neglected needs in peripheral cities. A municipal administrator in Ekaterinburg 
explained: “The World Cup is absolutely worth it. […] It is great accelerator of necessary things” (No-
vember 2015, Ekaterinburg). In this example, however, the attempt failed: the World Cup failed to 
bring necessary pressure to federal authorities, who — no doubt under pressure from the post-Crimea 
international sanctions as well as the economic hangover after the busted budgets of Sochi 2014 — 
preferred to fund a cheaper, temporary bus-oriented solution for the World Cup. 
Development between the host cities
A further example of the conflict between development priorities can be found not in the host cities 
but between them. When evaluating bids for the 2018 World Cup, one of FIFA’s concerns was the dis-
tance between Russian host cities and the lack of quality connections. This was flagged as a danger 
in the Russian bid and would lead to a dangerous overreliance on the country’s air transport system 
[FIFA, 2010]. To address these concerns, Russian organizers promised to expand the existing train 
network and to accelerate plans for rolling out high-speed rail networks between major cities. In this 
scheme, the Sapsan high speed connections between St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Nizhny Novgorod 
(all of which were World Cup host cities) would be augmented by new connections to Kazan and Ros-
tov and, in some plans, extended even as far as Sochi and Ekaterinburg. This would cut travel times 
significantly across much of European Russia, allaying some of FIFA’s concerns about overreliance 
on airplane transit, as well as providing long-term benefits for the nation through improved rail con-
nectivity. Organizing Committee CEO Alexey Sorokin explained:
The modernized transport infrastructure that will be ready for the tournament will also increase 
the population’s mobility. It will become a solid foundation for a long-lasting legacy for many 
Russian generations [Transport Ministry of the Russian Federation 2016, p. 2].
Here again appear the discourses connecting mega-event preparations to the country’s long-term 
improvement through urban development. Predictably, Russian regional administrators were enthu-
siastic about the possibility of high-speed linkages to Moscow, thereby diminishing the distances be-
tween the peripheries and the center. With improved connections to the center, after all, peripheral 
cities could hope for increased flows of attention, information, tourists, and capital.
As previously, however, the time pressures associated with inflexible World Cup deadlines en-
sured that infrastructure critical for the event took precedence over other projects. It proved easier 
to bolster the nation’s existing air transport system than to build several thousand kilometers of new 
high-speed rail. This left each host city with a modern, attractive airport capable of handling the 
peak traffic required in a first-order international mega-event, but it did not leave the nation with 
the promised new high-speed rail network. An administrator in Rostov shared his disappointment: 
“We had hoped to complete the [Sapsan] project quickly, but all we can do is wait patiently. […] The 
federal priority is the high-speed link between Moscow and Kazan, and that one is delayed too” (Sep-
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tember 2016, Rostov). As in Ekaterinburg, this regional administrator underscored the necessity of 
federal support, without which the regions are unable to complete costly, large scale projects. In the 
end, the demands of the mega-event outweighed the needs of the cities. 
Conclusion: Double mutations and forgotten spaces in the 2018 World Cup in Russia
The core issue in these developments appeared to be gaining federal attention, as peripheral author-
ities needed to convince central decisionmakers of the value of various regional projects. From this 
perspective, becoming a World Cup host city can be seen as a strategy to raise a peripheral city’s pro-
file in the eyes of central authorities who, crucially, hold the purse strings. Correspondingly, central 
authorities framed the Russian World Cup as a plan to modernize the peripheries, engaging a strategy 
of urban development from above. There were three problems with this strategy, however, which help 
explain the many divergences between World Cup development rhetoric and outcomes on the ground 
in Russia’s peripheral host cities. 
The first two problems with Russia 2018’s mega-event-driven urban development strategy can be 
discerned by employing a policy mobilities lens, while the third can be illuminated by unpacking the 
notion of peripherality. First, in line with other mega-events around the globe, Russia imported the 
Barcelona Model mobile policy during the 2018 World Cup in order to enact its urban development 
aspirations. These aspirations were stymied by the processes Müller [2017] describes as seizure: me-
ga-event priorities dominated the agenda at all scales from national to municipal, crowding out other 
needs under the pressure of saving face on the international stage. Tying development strategies to 
a mega-event means taking the risk that event priorities will overwhelm other needs. This can be 
understood as a mutation of mobilized policy and represents a common problem when attaching 
a development agenda to hosting a mega-event. In the Russian case, however, this mutation went 
a step further because of the centralized nature of government functioning which, combined with 
neoliberal legitimations, is explained here as a variegated expression of authoritarian mega-events.
Despite the neoliberal rhetoric of entrepreneurial urbanism through area-specific development 
strategies (as found, for example, in [Hall, 2006; Lauermann, 2014]), the World Cup was largely 
planned, managed, and funded from the center. This centralized authority meant that federal offi-
cials had the final authority over developments, and federal — that is, mega-event — priorities were 
supported instead of municipal needs. This offers a different explanation why many plans of local and 
regional importance did not come to pass, including Ekaterinburg’s promised metro expansion and 
the high-speed rail linkages to Sochi, Rostov, Kazan, and Ekaterinburg. Ultimately, since actors in the 
federal center controlled the funding, peripheral authorities were dictated to in a form of paternalis-
tic development that diminished local needs in favor of national goals. This dynamic augments the 
more familiar mutations visible in the processes of mega-event seizure, so that the articulation of the 
2018 World Cup actually represented a double mutation: both from abroad into Russia, and also from 
the center to the peripheral host cities. 
Finally, viewing the majority of Russian host cities as peripheral belies their economic and contribu-
tions to the national economy. Most of the host cities have populations of over one million, indicating 
their relative strength in the national political economic makeup. Particularly in the context of the 
World Cup, the fact that key decisions flowed from central authorities in Moscow reveals that these host 
cities were indeed peripheral, since they were excluded from the decision-making authority and una-
ble to dictate developments in the interests of their residents. Yet the peripheral exclusions go further 
when considering the relationship between the host cities — as regional capitals — and other cities in 
their regions. From this perspective, it becomes clear that the smaller regional cities were doubly pe-
ripheral, excluded by both Moscow and their regional capitals from mega-event-related development. 
Thus, the 2018 World Cup can be understood as a regional and urban development program, im-
ported into Russia as a mobile policy and wrapped in neoliberal rhetoric, though controlled by the 
central state. The centralized nature of these developments shaped the articulation of the mega-event 
towards fulfilling federal priorities and away from locally-oriented developments that may have ben-
efited host city populations, if they differed from the plans that were exerted from the center, while 
ignoring peripheral non-host cities almost entirely. In this way, the World Cup demonstrates not just 
the mutations that can be expected in a mega-event-driven urban development scheme, nor the mu-
tations that might be found in a center-periphery relationship, but rather a convoluted combination 
of the two, rife with multiple mutations and overlapping exclusions. 
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From the perspective of many peripheral host cities residents, the World Cup represented a cruel 
bait-and-switch, as demonstrated by the failed metro expansion in Ekaterinburg and the curtailed 
high-speed rail connections to the capital. Hosting the event was explained as an opportunity to en-
act a series of long-awaited material improvements, but many of the promised improvements were 
shelved in the context of high costs and inflexible World Cup deadlines that necessitated attention 
to critical mega-event infrastructures. Regardless of this, in many instances the mutated outcomes 
that diverged from the promises of earlier years were subsumed by the pleasure and spectacle of the 
event itself, in a common process of getting lost in the emotive power of the so-called feel-good fac-
tor [Hiller, Wanner, 2015]. In this way, residents often forget — at least temporarily — the disruptions, 
inconveniences, and broken promises that too often plague mega-event development. In the words 
of one Ekaterinburg resident in August 2018: “The transport situation is simply terrible, and I don’t 
think it will get better. […] Of course, they promised very many things at the beginning, but — as the 
saying goes — it turned out like always. […] But all the same, at least it was an excellent party!”
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Планировщики, политики и другие элиты часто используют мегасобытия, такие как чемпионат мира по футболу, как 
стратегию городского развития. Так произошло и с чемпионатом мира по футболу 2018 года, который проводился 
в одиннадцати городах России и предполагал модернизацию принимающих периферийных городов. Несмотря на то что 
идея развития городов с помощью мегасобытий широко распространена, российский опыт продемонстрировал много 
нового. 
Данная работа рассматривает развитие городов в рамках чемпионата мира по футболу в России как пример гибкой 
политики, показывает, каким образом это мегасобытие было импортировано из-за рубежа и как видооизменилась 
политика во время подготовки к мероприятию в принимающих российских городах. Специфика российского опыта 
во многом заключается в том, что оргкомитет чемпионата мира по футболу был создан и функционировал как 
дополнение к центральному правительству Москвы. Таким образом, то, что поначалу представлялось как способ 
дифференцирования принимающих городов путем их соревнования друг с другом в городском развитии, на самом деле 
оказалось установлением еще большей централизации в региональное пространственное планирование. Следовательно, 
даже при улучшении определенных материальных условий в принимающих городах чемпионат мира по футболу 
представлял собой не выражение региональной демократии и даже не стратегию межгородской дифференциации, а, 
скорее, еще один пример развития, продиктованный из центра, издалека.
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